Open adapter total: liquidity fees, net outbound network fees, and affiliate fees; RUNE block rewards excluded.
THORChain
One fee stream, six economically different destinations.
Adapter classification includes the RUNE burn, net outbound income, developer fund, and marketing fund.
Value attributed to the 5% RUNE burn. TCY distributions are supplier payments in the adapter taxonomy and are not included here.
The adapter reports $0.42 for 30 days while official documentation describes an emission schedule from the Reserve. Treating $0.42 as complete would be misleading.
Follow $100 of system income
The fixed outer allocation is known. The internal split of the 75% security-and-liquidity share changes with the incentive pendulum.
Dynamic split set by the incentive pendulum
Curated ruleDirect RUNE distribution to staked TCY
Curated ruleRUNE removed from supply
Curated ruleEarmarked contributor funding
Curated ruleEarmarked ecosystem marketing
Curated ruleRead before comparing: This is a rule map, not the observed 30-day recipient statement. Affiliate fees and inbound base-chain gas use separate paths.
The same questions,
even when answers differ.
“Not available” is a result, not a blank. Atlas refuses to convert missing costs or conflicting emissions into a zero.
Open adapter total: liquidity fees, net outbound network fees, and affiliate fees; RUNE block rewards excluded.
Adapter classification includes the RUNE burn, net outbound income, developer fund, and marketing fund.
The snapshot does not expose every direct gas and operating cost on a matching basis.
Value attributed to the 5% RUNE burn. TCY distributions are supplier payments in the adapter taxonomy and are not included here.
The published aggregate does not isolate the LP share after the incentive pendulum and other fee components.
Node income is dynamic and mixes fee-funded and reserve-funded rewards; a reconciled 30-day recipient amount was not retained in this snapshot.
The adapter reports $0.42 for 30 days while official documentation describes an emission schedule from the Reserve. Treating $0.42 as complete would be misleading.
Development, marketing, Reserve, and other protocol-controlled flows are not presented as one reconciled treasury figure.
Off-chain contributor, infrastructure, and operating costs are not available on a matching 30-day basis.
Total USD value of swaps sourced by the adapter from Midgard.
Current multi-chain pool value reported by the open adapter.
Mixed: required settlement/security utility, burn, and a separate revenue-share token
RUNE is required inside pools and node bonds, and 5% of documented system income is burned. TCY, not RUNE, receives the explicit 10% direct revenue share.
What keeps it working?
Real swap activity funds a meaningful share of the system, but the exact balance between fees, Reserve emissions, participant costs, and the post-debt TCY claim is not fully visible in one statement.
Who provides what—and takes which risk?
Swappers
- Receives
- Native cross-chain execution
- Provides
- Liquidity, network, affiliate, and chain gas fees
- Key risk
- Price impact and routing fees rise with liquidity conditions.
Liquidity providers
- Receives
- Liquidity fees plus a dynamic system-income share
- Provides
- Native asset and RUNE liquidity
- Key risk
- Inventory rebalancing, asset volatility, and protocol/security risk.
Node operators
- Receives
- Dynamic rewards and fee share
- Provides
- Bonded RUNE, chain infrastructure, and threshold-signature security
- Key risk
- Slashing, hardware costs, and RUNE price exposure.
TCY holders
- Receives
- 10% of documented system income in RUNE
- Provides
- A long-dated claim created during debt resolution
- Key risk
- Revenue variability, token liquidity, and protocol survival.
Which levers move the money?
Parameters matter because recipient outcomes can change while the headline fee or volume looks unchanged.
Model a changeSlip fee floors and outbound multiplier
Dynamic Mimir parameters by chain and assetChanges user cost, protocol overhead, and LP income without changing every fixed distribution share.
Network governance through MimirIncentive pendulum
Targets a 2:1 bond-to-pool ratioMoves the 75% participant allocation between security and liquidity as network conditions change.
Protocol algorithm and software parametersStrengths, dependencies, unknowns.
Strengths
- Native cross-chain demand creates observable fees.
- Outbound fee logic is designed to recover chain gas over time.
- The incentive mechanism responds to the security/liquidity balance.
Dependencies
- Sufficient RUNE bond value relative to pooled assets.
- Continued native swap volume and competitive execution.
- Liquidity-provider returns that remain attractive after inventory risk.
Still unknown
- Reconciled current node-versus-LP recipient totals.
- Complete 30-day Reserve emissions and operating costs.
- How TCY obligations change capital allocation over a full market cycle.
The rules changed.
The chart should remember.
TCY revenue share added
TCY was introduced during the ThorFi debt resolution and given a 10% share of network revenue, materially changing who receives system income.
RUNE burn isolated as holder revenue
The open adapter classifies only the 5% RUNE burn as value accruing to every RUNE holder and treats TCY as a separate supplier claim.
Trace the claim.
Rules come from protocol documentation or governance. Amounts come from official APIs or inspectable open adapters. Each has a different job.
DefiLlama · Open adapter
THORChain · Official docs
THORChain · Official docs
THORChain · Official docs