Multi-chain AMM exchange · Ethereum and multiple networks

Uniswap

Uniswap is a family of permissionless AMMs deployed across multiple networks. Traders pay pool fees; LPs receive most of them, while governance can activate protocol-fee shares that feed TokenJar, releasers, and the Firepit burn mechanism.

Snapshot 16 Jul 2026Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC)4 source records

Economic brief

Three answers before the ledger.

What users pay for
Users generate activity by swapping through v2/v3/v4 pools.
What the token gets
Protocol fees create a conditional UNI burn pipeline.
What gross flow hides
The fee base is large, but holder capture depends on which pools/chains have the fee switch activated and how reliably accrued assets progress through the burn pipeline.

User-paid fees

observed

$65.2M

User-paid swap fees across covered deployments. [1]

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · retrieved 2026-07-16

Protocol-directed

observed

$4M

Assigned to protocol fee/burn mechanism; not retained operating income. [1][3]

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · retrieved 2026-07-16

Holder-linked

observed

$4M

Accrued/assigned to the burn mechanism. Executed UNI burn is not separately measured here. [1][3]

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · retrieved 2026-07-16

Net revenue

unavailable

Not available

Operating costs and release/burn execution timing are not period-matched. [1][3]

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · retrieved 2026-07-16

Money flow

$100 normalized trailing-30-day allocation

Derived from normalized fees less protocol/holder flow. Activated pool configurations differ; this is the aggregate observed mix, not the fee switch for every pool.

The diagram and table use the same values. Color is reinforced by labels and classifications.

01 · PayerPool traders and swappers

Users generate activity by swapping through v2/v3/v4 pools.

02 · Fee base$65.2M

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC)

derived
LP residual93.9%

Participant income · $61.2M of the normalized fee base

Assigned to UNI burn pipeline6.1%

Token burn · $4M of the normalized fee base

Accessible allocation table for Uniswap
RecipientSharePer $100Classification
LP residual93.9%$93.9Participant income
Assigned to UNI burn pipeline6.1%$6.1Token burn

Normalized statement

Every number keeps its boundary.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC). USD. Review and retrieval: 2026-07-16. Missing data is never displayed as zero.

User-paid fees

observed
$65.2M

User-paid swap fees across covered deployments. [1]

Method, period & unit

DefiLlama trailing-30-day fees adapter total.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Protocol-directed flow

observed
$4M

Assigned to protocol fee/burn mechanism; not retained operating income. [1][3]

Method, period & unit

DefiLlama protocol revenue classification.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Net protocol revenue

unavailable
Not available

Operating costs and release/burn execution timing are not period-matched. [1][3]

Method, period & unit

No defensible period-matched figure available.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Holder-linked value

observed
$4M

Accrued/assigned to the burn mechanism. Executed UNI burn is not separately measured here. [1][3]

Method, period & unit

DefiLlama holder-revenue classification.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

LP / supply-side income

derived
$61.3M

A reconciliation residual. DefiLlama's separately queried supply-side series was $62.09M and did not reconcile, so it is not substituted silently. [1][2]

Method, period & unit

$65,220,623 user fees − $3,955,507 protocol/holder flow.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Validator / node income

unavailable
Not available

Network validator/sequencer fees are separate chain costs, not Uniswap protocol income. [2]

Method, period & unit

No defensible period-matched figure available.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Token incentives

source conflict
Not available

Incentive adapters and governance programs do not provide one complete comparable 30-day subsidy cost. [1][4]

Method, period & unit

Sources or definitions do not support one comparable 30-day value.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Treasury income

unavailable
Not available

The activated protocol-fee flow is modeled as burn-directed, not retained treasury income. [3]

Method, period & unit

No defensible period-matched figure available.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Unclassified residual

derived
$0

Reconciles by construction; source-side discrepancy is disclosed in the LP note. [1]

Method, period & unit

$65,220,623 fees − $61,265,116 residual LP flow − $3,955,507 protocol flow.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Economic profit

unavailable
Not available

Direct costs, incentives, and execution timing are incomplete. [1][3]

Method, period & unit

No defensible period-matched figure available.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Token value capture

What the token actually gets

Protocol fees create a conditional UNI burn pipeline. TokenJar accrual, release, conversion, and final UNI burn are distinct states and should not be conflated.

Sustainability

What gross flow still hides

The fee base is large, but holder capture depends on which pools/chains have the fee switch activated and how reliably accrued assets progress through the burn pipeline.

Recipients

Who receives value

  • LPs receive the majority of swap fees.
  • Protocol-fee assets enter the TokenJar/releaser/Firepit path.
  • UNI holders benefit indirectly only when the pipeline produces actual supply reduction.
  • Validators/sequencers receive separate network fees outside Uniswap revenue.

Governance

What can change

  • UNI governance can configure protocol-fee shares within version-specific limits.
  • Governance and operational releasers affect the timing of conversion and burn.
  • Incentive programs can subsidize liquidity without changing organic fee revenue.

Risk register

What can break the thesis

  • Accrued protocol fees may be mistaken for completed burn.
  • Coverage differs by chain, version, and activated pool.
  • Separate supply-side API series did not reconcile with the fee total in this snapshot.
  • Liquidity can migrate when LP economics change.

Model history

How the economics changed

  • Uniswap historically directed pool fees to LPs.
  • The UNIfication governance change activated protocol-fee-funded UNI burn mechanics.
  • This profile now separates accrual into the mechanism from executed burn.

Source ledger

Follow every material claim.

Primary sources establish mechanisms. DefiLlama supplies a consistent cross-protocol time series and is labeled as third-party normalization.

  1. Normalized third-party data

    Uniswap metrics and methodology ↗

    Retrieved
    2026-07-16
    Source updated
    Trailing snapshot through 15 Jul 2026
  2. Official documentation

    Protocol fee configuration ↗

    Retrieved
    2026-07-16
    Source updated
    Living documentation
  3. Official documentation

    Uniswap protocol fee flow ↗

    Retrieved
    2026-07-16
    Source updated
    Living documentation
  4. Governance source

    UNIfication proposal ↗

    Retrieved
    2026-07-16
    Source updated
    Proposal discussion

Continue the analysis

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