Cross-chain AMM exchange · THORChain L1

THORChain

THORChain lets users swap native assets across chains without wrapped tokens. Swap, outbound, and liquidity fees fund system income; protocol rules then split that income across security, liquidity, suppliers, burn, and operating destinations.

Snapshot 16 Jul 2026Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC)4 source records

Economic brief

Three answers before the ledger.

What users pay for
Users create economic activity by swapping native assets, withdrawing liquidity, and consuming outbound network capacity.
What the token gets
RUNE benefits from documented burn and from its security/liquidity role.
What gross flow hides
Fee-funded security improves as organic swap activity grows, but reserve/emission support and the combined node/LP adapter field prevent a defensible net-revenue figure.

User-paid fees

observed

$596.9K

User-paid DEX fees; excludes token issuance. [1]

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · retrieved 2026-07-16

Protocol-directed

observed

$86.5K

Protocol-directed before direct operating/security costs. [1]

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · retrieved 2026-07-16

Holder-linked

observed

$28.5K

Supply reduction, not a cash distribution. [1][3]

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · retrieved 2026-07-16

Net revenue

source conflict

Not available

Period-matched reserve emissions and direct costs are not fully available. [1][2][3]

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · retrieved 2026-07-16

Money flow

$100 documented system-income allocation

Curated from the official tokenomics split. It describes system income allocation, not a claim that every DefiLlama fee dollar follows this exact period-matched route.

The diagram and table use the same values. Color is reinforced by labels and classifications.

01 · PayerCross-chain liquidity takers

Users create economic activity by swapping native assets, withdrawing liquidity, and consuming outbound network capacity.

02 · Allocation model$100 modeled

$100 documented system-income allocation

curated
Nodes + LPs75%

Participant income · curated system-income share

TCY suppliers10%

Holder-linked · curated system-income share

RUNE burn5%

Token burn · curated system-income share

Development5%

Treasury · curated system-income share

Marketing5%

Other recipient · curated system-income share

Accessible allocation table for THORChain
RecipientSharePer $100Classification
Nodes + LPs75%$75Participant income
TCY suppliers10%$10Holder-linked
RUNE burn5%$5Token burn
Development5%$5Treasury
Marketing5%$5Other recipient

Normalized statement

Every number keeps its boundary.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC). USD. Review and retrieval: 2026-07-16. Missing data is never displayed as zero.

User-paid fees

observed
$596.9K

User-paid DEX fees; excludes token issuance. [1]

Method, period & unit

DefiLlama trailing-30-day fees adapter total.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Protocol-directed flow

observed
$86.5K

Protocol-directed before direct operating/security costs. [1]

Method, period & unit

DefiLlama trailing-30-day protocol revenue classification.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Net protocol revenue

source conflict
Not available

Period-matched reserve emissions and direct costs are not fully available. [1][2][3]

Method, period & unit

Sources or definitions do not support one comparable 30-day value.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Holder-linked value

observed
$28.5K

Supply reduction, not a cash distribution. [1][3]

Method, period & unit

DefiLlama holder-revenue classification, cross-checked against the documented RUNE burn route.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

LP / supply-side income

observed
$510.4K

Combined nodes and LPs; not a pure LP figure. [1][2]

Method, period & unit

DefiLlama supply-side revenue.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Validator / node income

source conflict
Not available

The normalized source does not isolate nodes from LPs for the period. [1][2]

Method, period & unit

Sources or definitions do not support one comparable 30-day value.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Token incentives

source conflict
Not available

Official material describes reserve/security mechanics, but no complete period-matched USD subsidy cost reconciles with the adapter. [1][2][3]

Method, period & unit

Sources or definitions do not support one comparable 30-day value.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Treasury income

unavailable
Not available

No equivalent retained treasury-income series was available. [2][3]

Method, period & unit

No defensible period-matched figure available.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Unclassified residual

derived
$4

Rounding residual; economically immaterial. [1]

Method, period & unit

$596,913 fees − $510,392 supply side − $86,517 protocol-directed flow.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Economic profit

unavailable
Not available

Direct costs and issuance are incomplete, so accounting profit is not stated. [1][2]

Method, period & unit

No defensible period-matched figure available.

Trailing 30 days ending 15 Jul 2026 (UTC) · USD · retrieved 2026-07-16

Token value capture

What the token actually gets

RUNE benefits from documented burn and from its security/liquidity role. TCY is a distinct supplier claim, so TCY distributions are not counted as RUNE-holder value.

Sustainability

What gross flow still hides

Fee-funded security improves as organic swap activity grows, but reserve/emission support and the combined node/LP adapter field prevent a defensible net-revenue figure.

Recipients

Who receives value

  • Liquidity providers and nodes share system income.
  • TCY suppliers receive a defined system-income allocation.
  • RUNE holders receive indirect value through burn, not cash.
  • Development and marketing destinations receive explicit allocations.

Governance

What can change

  • Mimir and protocol governance can change economic constants and fee parameters.
  • Changes to TCY allocation shift value among suppliers, nodes/LPs, and other destinations.
  • Outbound and slip fee mechanics change the payer burden and total fee base.

Risk register

What can break the thesis

  • Node/LP income is not isolated in the normalized period.
  • Reserve and security subsidy cost is source-conflicted.
  • Cross-chain security and outbound costs can change independently of fee revenue.
  • RUNE and TCY capture are easy to conflate.

Model history

How the economics changed

  • The incentive-pendulum model historically targeted security/liquidity balance.
  • TCY added a separate supplier claim to system income.
  • Current documentation defines the 75/10/5/5/5 allocation.

Source ledger

Follow every material claim.

Primary sources establish mechanisms. DefiLlama supplies a consistent cross-protocol time series and is labeled as third-party normalization.

  1. Normalized third-party data

    THORChain DEX metrics and adapter methodology ↗

    Retrieved
    2026-07-16
    Source updated
    Trailing snapshot through 15 Jul 2026
  2. Official documentation

    THORChain economic model ↗

    Retrieved
    2026-07-16
    Source updated
    Living documentation
  3. Official documentation

    Tokenomics of RUNE and TCY ↗

    Retrieved
    2026-07-16
    Source updated
    Living documentation
  4. Official documentation

    THORChain fees ↗

    Retrieved
    2026-07-16
    Source updated
    Living documentation

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